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T
he recessionary headwinds that began 
in late 2007 show few signs of abating. 
In the United States, we have witnessed 
sizable declines in employment; a multitril-
lion dollar decline in household net wealth, 
which has shaken consumer confidence 
and eroded consumer spending; a record-
smashing plunge in the single-family housing 
construction industry, coupled with historic 
declines in house prices; a domestic auto-
motive industry fighting through the worst 
slump in decades; and, not least, spectacular 
fraud, failure and turmoil in the banking and 
financial investment sector.  Not surprisingly, 
real GDP contracted at a 6.25 percent annual 
rate in the fourth quarter of 2008, its largest 
decline since 1982.  Moreover, economic 
activity is likely to decline and the unemploy-
ment rate rise through the first half of 2009. 
Otherwise, things are OK.
In response to these events, policymak-
ers worldwide have scrambled to prop up 
their ailing economies.  To begin with, 
central banks in the United States and most 
other major countries have significantly 
reduced their interest rate targets.  In the 
United Kingdom, for example, the Bank of 
England has lowered its target to its lowest 
level in more than 300 years.  In the United 
States, the Federal Open Market Committee 
reduced its federal funds target rate to zero, 
in effect, and communicated it would keep 
the target there for an extended period.  
Many central banks have also imple-
mented new, unconventional lending facili-
ties designed to stabilize credit and financial 
markets.  In early March, the Federal Reserve 
unveiled yet another new special lending 
program:  the Term Asset-Backed Securities 
Loan Facility.  As a result of this and previ-
ous actions, the Fed engineered a stunning 
escalation in the monetary base  
(the raw material for money creation) from 
about $871 billion in August 2008 to more 
than $1.7 trillion in January 2009. 
Fiscal authorities have also jumped into 
the fray.  In February, Congress passed, and 
President Barack Obama signed, a $787 
billion package of expenditures and tax cuts 
designed to boost economic activity over a 
two-year period.  Then, building upon the 
$700 billion Troubled Asset Relief Program 
(TARP), which was implemented in October 
2008, the administration unveiled its Finan-
cial Stability Plan in February.  In addition to 
offering more financial assistance for bank-
ing organizations, the plan seeks to stem the 
tide of home foreclosures.
Finally, in its budget that was released 
in late February, the Obama administra-
tion proposed to spend $3.9 trillion in fiscal 
year 2009, a 32 percent increase from a year 
earlier.  This startling level of spending is 
projected to be about 28 percent of GDP and 
to produce a budget deficit of $1.7 trillion in 
the fiscal year that ends Sept. 30—easily the 
largest expansion of government spending 
since World War II. 
Weighing the Costs and Benefits
Does the depth of the current recession 
justify this level of intervention?  In March 
2009, the recession was into its 16th month, 
which is considerably longer than the post- 
WWII average duration of 10 months.  How-
ever, it is not yet clear that the recession will 
be deeper than normal, though that looked 
increasingly likely as of March.  For the  
10 recessions that have occurred from 1945  
to 2001, the average peak-to-trough decline 
in real GDP is 2.1 percent, while the unem-
ployment rate increases by an average of 
 
 
2.9 percentage  
points.  Through the  
fourth quarter of 2008,  
real GDP had declined only  
1.7 percent from its peak in 2008:Q2,  
while the unemployment rate had risen  
by 3.7 percentage points from its trough in  
the fourth quarter of 2007.  These numbers, 
while likely to worsen further over the first 
half of 2009, still pale in comparison to 
the 27 percent decline in real GDP and the 
nearly 25-percentage-point increase in the 
unemployment rate that occurred from 1929 
to 1933. 
When the depth and duration of the 
current recession are put into a historical 
context, the economic justification for the 
massive monetary and fiscal stimulus actions 
becomes less clear.  While these actions may 
indeed end the recession significantly sooner 
than if policymakers had adopted a more 
moderate course of action, this benefit might 
be more than offset over time by (1) higher 
future marginal tax rates to pay for the 
increase in public debt, (2) a more interven-
tionist regulatory structure that diminishes 
the role of market incentives and (3) the 
possibility of higher inflation and inflation 
expectations from excessive money growth. 
Policymakers must be exceedingly careful 
not to put in place policies that begin to erode 
the nation’s growth rate of labor productivity, 
which is the building block for rising living 
standards over time. 
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